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 1 
Past Killings and Proportionality in War 
 
When war starts, things often don’t go as planned, so we make new plans; either 
plans to continue or plans to stop. Our question is: what are the implications of the 
fact that things have gone awry for our new plans? Obviously, the fact that things 
haven’t gone as planned may have epistemic significance. War is more trial and 
error than some would like to admit. And our earlier acts can change the facts – they 
can make it harder for us to achieve our aims, for example by strengthening the 
resolve of our opponents, or by making it more likely that insurgent forces will 
disrupt our plans, or by demoralizing our forces so that they are less likely to 
succeed if the war continues.  
Often, a country that commits itself to war finds it hard to extricate itself, for 
both practical and psychological reasons. Withdrawing from a war may make a 
country seem weak, and that may make it more vulnerable to future attacks; it is 
difficult for politicians who have supported a war to concede that they have wrongly 
ordered their own combatants to face the burdens of combat; and politicians and 
military leaders are motivated to ensure that the losses that combatants and others 
have suffered are not in vain. These motivations and others can lead wars to go on 
longer than they ought to, even when it is clear that the goals of war are 
                                                 
 This article builds on some arguments that I developed in the course of discussing 
C Fabre ‘War Exit’ (2015) 125 Ethics 631 on PEA Soup: 
http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2015/05/ethics-discussions-at-pea-soup-
cecile-fabres-war-exit-with-critical-precis-by-helen-frowe.html. I am grateful to 
Cécile for helping me to develop my views. I am also grateful to the war discussion 
group at Oxford for their thoughts about an earlier draft. Thanks to Seth Lazar for 
sharing his unpublished work on this issue, and to Jeff McMahan and Darrell 
Moellendorf for discussion of the topic. I am especially grateful to the Leverhulme 
Trust for a Major Research Fellowship that afforded me the time to work on this 
article. 
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insufficiently important to justify continuing to fight. WWI and the US war in 
Vietnam are perhaps the most obvious examples. 
The question I address here is concerned with the moral difference that losses 
inflicted in war make to the decision to continue: whether the harm that a country 
causes early in the war makes a difference as such to what it is now permitted to do 
– whether it makes a difference not simply because of the difference it makes to its 
evidence, or because the facts have changed. I argue that one way in which the past 
has been thought significant in this way is either insignificant, or not very 
significant: the fact that some innocent people have been killed as a side-effect of a 
war does not affect forward-looking wide proportionality calculations as such, or if 
it does it does not affect them much.  
Whether harm-causing conduct is widely proportionate depends on the 
relationship between the good that the harm-causing conduct achieves, or is 
reasonably expected to achieve, and the harm that the conduct inflicts, where those 
who are harmed are not liable to suffer that harm. If they are not so liable they have 
a right not to be harmed. Harm-causing conduct can nevertheless sometimes be 
justified because the good that will be done by the conduct is sufficiently important 
to justify infringing the rights of others. When it is, that conduct is widely 
proportionate. Wide-proportionality contrasts with narrow proportionality, which is 
concerned with harming liable people.1  
To clarify the issue I am concerned with, I will focus on variations on this 
case:  
 
Early Losses. Country X goes to war with country Y to save 50000 people who 
will otherwise be killed by Y’s officials. According to X’s evidence at the time 
of going to war, t1, doing this is expected to kill 10000 innocent people. That 
number (I stipulate) is small enough that going to war is proportionate, but 
only just. It would be disproportionate to kill 12000 innocent people to save 
                                                 
1 Jeff McMahan developed the distinction between wide proportionality and narrow 
proportionality. See, especially, Killing in War (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 20-1. 
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the 50000. The war begins at t1, but unfortunately things do not go as 
planned. Early battles are lost and 10000 innocents are killed as a side-effect. 
At t2, X does a new calculation. According to its evidence, the 50000 can still 
be saved, but some more innocents will be killed.  
 
I will treat country X as the relevant agent for evaluation, though nothing turns on 
this. Suppose that given other facts about the war, whether continuing to fight is 
permissible depends on whether doing so is widely disproportionate. If the future 
losses are sufficiently small for this to be so, continuing to fight is permissible; if it is 
too large, continuing to fight is wrong. Our question is whether the fact that X has 
already killed 10000 makes a difference as such to wide proportionality judgements. 
Here are three scenarios: 
 
 Early Losses 1: Saving the 50000 is expected to result in 2000 more deaths. 
 
 Early Losses 2: Saving the 50000 is expected to result in 10000 more deaths. 
 
 Early Losses 3: Saving the 50000 is expected to result in 12000 more deaths. 
 
 Here are four views: 
 
Quota: If X’s evidence warrants the belief that the total number of deaths that 
will be caused to save the 50000, including those killed in the early battles and 
those still to be killed, will make the war fact-relative widely disproportionate 
as a whole if it continues to fight, X ought not to continue to fight at t2. 
 
Discount: The fact that X has caused 10000 deaths in the effort to save the 
50000 counts against causing further deaths at t2, and can make it widely 
disproportionate to continue fighting, but each of these deaths count for less 
against continuing to fight than each prospective death. 
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Prospect: The fact that X has caused 10000 deaths in the effort to save the 50000 
does not count at all either for or against continuing to fight at t2. 
 
Addition: The fact that X has caused 10000 deaths in the effort to save the 
50000 counts in favour of continuing to fight at t2, and can make it 
proportionate to kill more people to save the 50000 than was the case at t1. 
 
As we will see, fully specifying these views (other than Prospect) requires us to be 
careful about which past losses affect future decisions. For example, does it depend 
on whether these losses are caused by this country; or in this war; or in service of 
saving this 50000? Let us leave these complications aside for the moment. 
If wide proportionality is all that is at stake, Quota implies that continuing to 
fight is wrong in all three Early Losses cases. There is a quota of deaths that X may 
cause to save the 50000. It is wrong for X to exceed this quota, as it will in all three 
cases. Discount need not have this implication. It might imply that continuing to fight 
is permissible in Early Losses 1 but wrong in Early Losses 2 and Early Losses 3. Prospect 
implies that continuing to fight is permissible in both Early Losses 1 and Early Losses 
2, but wrong in Early Losses 3. Addition implies that continuing to fight is permissible 
in Early Losses 1 and Early Losses 2, and even perhaps in Early Losses 3. 
 Whilst I restrict my discussion to the context of war, it has wider application. 
It is part of a more general theory of how the costs of our past actions affect what we 
ought to do. That more general question includes the rationality of continuing to 
pursue a course of conduct that has proved costly to me – what economists refer to 
as the problem of sunk costs. The discussion in this paper, though, is restricted to the 
question of the effect of past side-effect costs of our actions on the proportionality of 
inflicting future side-effect costs on others. That is not quite the issue of sunk costs, 
as the relevant costs are not costs borne by the agent deciding what to do, but are 
borne by others. Even the issue I focus on here is important beyond the context of 
war, though. For example, it is permissible to build public buildings only if the 
disruption to local residents is not too great. If the disruption caused in the early 
stages of building is greater than expected, and less progress is made than expected, 
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what difference does past disruption make to the permissibility of continuing to 
build? But addressing the problem is especially important for the context of war, 
where life and death is at stake. 
 Section I shows both that the two main attractions of Quota are illusory. 
Section II offers a decisive argument against Quota. Section III suggests that even if 
lost lives count against continuing to fight, they cannot count against doing so in the 
same way as prospective losses. Section IV responds to an argument that might be 
offered in favour of Discount: one that suggests that past harms are clearly relevant 
in intrapersonal cases, so they must be relevant in interpersonal cases. Section V 
rejects further arguments that the rights of the 50000 to be saved are weakened, or 
the duties of X not to kill are strengthened, by past losses. Section VI rejects the two 
best arguments that I can find in favour of Addition. Overall, I support Prospect. 
  
I. The Illusory Appeal of Quota 
 
I am most confident that Quota is wrong. In this section I show that three reasons 
given for Quota do not support it. In the next section I offer a decisive argument 
against it. 
 
i) Evaluating the War as a Whole. 
 
One argument for Quota is that it seems that if X continues to fight at t2 in Early 
Losses, the war as a whole will be disproportionate, and thus X will have acted 
wrongly overall. Some think that only Quota can adequately explain this judgement. 
Darrell Moellendorf expresses this view thus: 
 
A central question in the morality of continuing the war in, and occupation of, 
Afghanistan has been whether the realization of the cause is worth the total 
moral costs. That seems like a meaningful question…If we were to employ a 
conception of proportionality that looks only forward, any such criticism 
would be fundamentally confused…Such a conception of proportionality is 
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unable to make sense of an important part of the current practice of arguing 
about war. It, therefore, does a grave disservice to our moral understanding.2 
 
It may be true that we need a way of capturing the idea that the war as a whole is 
disproportionate, but friends of Prospect have a way. 
To see this I rely on a distinction between kinds of wrongness that Derek 
Parfit has made familiar: the distinction between fact-relative and evidence-relative 
wrongness.3 In the fact-relative sense, whether a person has acted wrongly depends 
solely on the facts, regardless of whether the person is aware of those facts, or has 
evidence of them.4 In the evidence-relative sense, it depends on the evidence 
available to that person. For example, suppose that I serve you a drink which has 
poison in it, but I have no evidence that there is poison in it. What I do is fact-relative 
wrong but evidence-relative permissible. In contrast, if I give you a drink which 
does not have poison in it, but I have strong evidence that it does, my act is fact-
relative permissible but evidence-relative wrong. 
Now suppose that Prospect is right, and X is permitted to continue fighting in 
Early Losses 1. It does so, kills 2000 as expected, and saves the 50000. X’s total set of 
acts from t1 to the saving of the 50000, are wrong in the fact-relative sense, because 
                                                 
2 See D Moellendorf ‘Two Doctrines of Jus ex Bello’ (2015) 125 Ethics 653, 667. For a 
similar idea, see C Fabre ‘War Exit’ (2015) 125 Ethics 631, 637. 
3 See, especially, D Parfit On What Matters vol.1 (Oxford: OUP, 2011) ch.7. 
4 Parfit suggests that an act is fact relative wrong ‘just when this act would be wrong 
in the ordinary sense if we knew all of the relevant facts’ (On What Matters vo.1, 150). 
The counterfactual test that Parfit proposes is best understood as an imperfect 
heuristic device for fact-relative wrongness rather than an account of what it is, 
because knowledge of the facts may be morally important as such. For example, on 
the best sense of fact-relative wrongness, it might be fact-relative wrong for me to 
declare that I am knowledgeable when I am not, but it would not be wrong for me to 
declare that I am knowledgeable were I to know all of the relevant facts. Nothing 
turns on this refinement for our purposes though. 
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this total set of acts has saved 50000 at the cost of 12000, which is widely 
disproportionate. As these acts of war constitute the war, the war as a whole is 
disproportionate, and because of that the war as a whole is wrongful in the fact-
relative sense. We need not claim that X acts wrongly at t2 for this judgement to be 
warranted.  
 It might be argued that X should stop fighting because if it continues the 
conjunction of its acts will be fact-relative wrong. But this conclusion is too quick. 
The conjunction of X’s acts is fact-relative wrong whatever X does at t2. If X kills 
10000 between t1 and t2, and stops fighting at t2, X has killed 10000 people to save 
no one at all. This set of acts, taken together, would also be fact-relative wrong, for at 
t1 it would obviously have been wrong for X to kill 10000 people in a way that 
would not save anyone. X has decisive evidence that if it stops now, it will have 
killed 10000 people and saved no one. So at t2 it has decisive evidence that its acts of 
killing and then stopping are together wrong.  
Once we see that X’s conjunction of acts at t1 and t2 is fact-relative wrong 
whatever it does, some of the appeal of Quota is lost.5 Some of its appeal is due to the 
judgement that rejecting it seems to involve giving up on our initial proportionality 
assessment at t1, or treating that assessment as morally unimportant. But at the same 
time, we must make room for an equally important assessment – that killing 10000 
people to save no one is gravely morally wrong. The impression that Quota has an 
advantage because it can explain the first assessment is dispelled once we see that it 
fails to explain the second. 
 
ii) Protecting Interests and Respecting Rights 
 
A second idea is that only Quota adequately protects the interests of those who will 
be killed after t2. Cécile Fabre argues as follows. The interests of these people would 
have protected them at t1 had X known the facts: they would have counted 
                                                 
5 For a related argument, see J McMahan ‘Proportionality and Time’ (2015) 125 Ethics 
696, 706-7. 
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decisively against saving the 50000 at t1. If X is permitted to proceed at t2, they are 
no longer protected. She concludes that only Quota provides an adequate constraint 
against killing.6  
 In response, it is true that the 2000 lack a protection at t2 that they would have 
had at t1 had X known all the facts. The question is whether this is troubling. 
Whether our interests are sufficiently important to make it wrong for others to set 
those interests back often depends on other facts, such as whether the act that sets 
back our interests also sets back other people’s interests. For example, whether my 
interest in not being killed protects me from being killed as a side-effect of saving 
50000 people depends on whether I am a member of a group of people that is 
sufficiently large to make the saving of the 50000 disproportionate. If that group is 
sufficiently large, my interest protects me. If it is not, it doesn’t.  
In Early Losses 1 these facts have changed. At t1, the 2000 were part of a larger 
group of 12000 people whose interests would all have been set back by the acts that 
save the 50000, and because they were part of this large group their interests would 
have protected them from being killed had X known all of the facts. But at t2 they 
are no longer in this group. The 10000 are now dead, so killing the 2000 at t2 no 
longer sets back the interests of the 10000. So the interests of the 2000 no longer 
protect them.  
Perhaps it might be argued that in proceeding, X would fail to respect the 
rights of the 2000. Their rights would have protected them from being killed were X 
to have known all the facts at t1. The proper way to respect their rights is to refrain 
from acting at t2 in a way that would have constituted a rights violation at t1.  
In response, respecting the rights of the 2000 involves giving the interests of 
the 2000 the proper weight in our deliberations. Prospect is compatible with X doing 
this at both t1 and t2. As X’s evidence justified going to war at t1, ex hypothesi, X has 
not failed to respect these rights at this stage. At t2, X weighs the interests of the 2000 
and the 50000 who can still be saved. If Prospect is right, the lives of the 10000 make 
no difference to how these interests should be weighed. But that in no way 
                                                 
6 See Fabre ‘War Exit’ 637.  
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diminishes the importance of the rights of the 2000 in assessing what X should do. It 
is just that in X’s new circumstances, X has decisive evidence that they are 
outweighed by the interests of the 50000.  
It is true that the rights of the 2000 would have been sufficiently important to 
make it wrong for X to go to war at t1 had X known the facts. But X has not violated 
the rights of the 2000 between t1 and t2; these people have not yet been affected at 
all. If X kills them, their deaths will make the war as a whole fact-relative wrong, 
because too many people were killed to save the 50000, and they were part of the 
group of people whose deaths make this true. But that does not imply that X ought 
to desist, for as I have already noted, X’s acts together will also be wrong in the fact-
relative sense if X desists. That will be so because the rights of the 10000 will have 
been violated in the fact-relative sense.  
It is true that X’s fact-relative wrongful acts at t1 makes it the case that the 
rights of the 2000 do not protect them. But it is hard to see why the fact that X has 
acted wrongly towards the 10000 at t1 should count in favour of protecting the 2000. 
Compare this 2000 people with another group of 2000, who could be killed to save 
50000 other people, but who were never part of a larger group that made saving the 
50000 fact-relative wrong. Why should the latter group receive less protection from 
being killed than the former group simply because, as a matter of luck, the rights of 
the former group made it true that X acted wrongly in the fact-relative sense at t1?  
Perhaps it will be argued that if X proceeds it will have violated more rights 
than if it desists. If X fights at t2 it will have violated 12000 rights. If it desists it will 
have violated 10000 rights. It is plausible that in a disproportionate war, the right to 
life of each person whose death makes the war disproportionate is violated. But the 
view that this consideration favours stopping gives no weight at all to the interests 
of the 50000, who will be killed if X does not continue. Their interests counterbalance 
the rights of those who will be killed. 
Some may argue that as the 50000 would not have had a right to be saved had 
X known all the facts at t1, their rights are not engaged at t2. But the idea that this 
argument rests on cannot be right. The reason why the 50000 would not have had a 
right to be saved is because of the 10000 who have been killed between t1 and t2. The 
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fact that the deaths of the 10000 would have made it wrong for X to save the 50000 
cannot negate the significance of the interests of the 50000 at t2 altogether.  
To see this, consider: 
 
No Cost: As Early Losses except 12000 are killed between t1 and t2, but the 
50000 can be saved at no cost to anyone. 
 
I stipulated that it is disproportionate to kill 12000 to save 50000. Had X known all of 
the facts at t1, it would thus have been wrong for X to act. But it is surely wrong not 
to save the 50000 from death at t2 where this can be done at no cost. And failing to 
do this would surely wrong the 50000: they have a right to be saved where this can 
be done at no cost. Thus the fact that they would not have had a right to be saved at 
t1 does not completely undermine their right to be saved at t2. It might be argued 
that the rights of the 50000 are significantly weakened, even if they are not lost 
altogether. But this is an argument for Discount, not Quota. We will consider it below. 
 
iii) Iteration 
 
A second familiar argument that has been offered to support Quota concerns 
iteration. To see the problem that this argument is concerned with, suppose that in 
Early Losses 2, things again don’t go as planned at t2. 10000 more people are killed at 
the next stage of fighting, and these battles are also lost. At t3, according to evidence 
available to X, the 50000 can be saved at the cost of a further 10000. And the same 
thing happens again and again, with continued losses, and without X getting any 
closer to saving the 50000. Some favour Quota because it avoids the implication that 
iterated permissible mistakes like this are possible.7 
 This argument for Quota also fails. First, it is hard to see why the possibility of 
iteration has implications in circumstances where it does not occur. We have already 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Moellendorf ‘Two Doctrines of Jus ex Bello’, 664-6. Seth Lazar 
discusses the idea at greater length in ‘Moral Sunk Costs’, unpublished ms. 
 11 
noted that acts can be fact-relative wrong or evidence-relative wrong. First begin 
with the question whether the possibility of iteration makes X’s act at t2 fact-relative 
wrong. Suppose that X continues to fight in Early Losses 2 at t2. It kills 10000 and 
saves the 50000. It is difficult to see how the possibility of iteration can make doing 
this fact-relative wrong where iteration does not occur. 
But if the possibility of iteration cannot make X’s conduct fact-relative wrong, 
it is also difficult to see why it should make it evidence-relative wrong. X had 
evidence at t2 that there was some possibility that the 50000 would not be saved 
without many iterations of the same set of acts under similar evidential 
circumstances – there is always some chance that this is so. But this is just one piece 
of evidence that X has at each successive stage of the war to determine whether 
continuing is evidence-relative permissible. It must be weighed against other 
possibilities, such as the possibility that X will save many more people than 
expected, or kill far fewer people than expected, if it continues.  
Perhaps it might be argued that the possibility of iteration is especially 
important, because if it is permissible to iterate one’s decision the war can cause 
catastrophic harm. But the probability that this will occur may be tiny, and friends of 
Quota cannot think that a small probability of catastrophic harm is necessarily 
decisive. There is always some chance that a small war will trigger a catastrophic 
event, such as a nuclear war, without the aim of the small war being achieved, yet 
friends of Quota are not pacifists. And, of course, there is always some probability 
that catastrophic harm will occur if one does not go to war, or does not continue a 
war that one has started. 
It is also not clear why the potential for catastrophic losses through iteration 
supports Quota in particular. There is an epistemic risk that 10000 will be killed 
without X making progress to save the 50000 at each successive stage in an iterated 
series. Why should the possibility of catastrophic losses demand that X stops at t2 
rather than at t1, t3, or some point further down the line? 
A second response draws on the idea that the problem of iteration is not 
restricted to single wars. It can arise across decisions to start different wars, and 
decisions not to start different wars. Because of this, if there is a problem of iteration, 
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it arises for Quota as well as Prospect. Indeed, it arises for any evidence-relative 
principle in the ethics of harm. This should incline us to think that there is no 
problem of iteration. 
Quota requires a country not to pursue the particular war that it has started 
when it causes a certain number of deaths, but it has no implications for decisions to 
start new wars. Now suppose that Quota is true, and X thus stops fighting in Early 
Losses. A further 50000 people are then threatened in another country, Y2. X goes to 
war, suffers early losses in battles resulting in the deaths of 10000 people, and then 
stops fighting. A further 50000 people are then threatened in a further country, Y3, 
and so on. X can comply with Quota, and yet X will kill a very large number of 
people for no benefit at all. Those who have the intuition that X ought to stop in the 
intra-war case will surely have the same intuition in the inter-war case.  
Perhaps some will claim that this is enough to show that Prospect is false, 
though. It is just that past harms caused should be discounted in both the intra-war 
and the inter-war case. But in response, we can extend the objection further. Just as 
there is no reason to think that the problem of iteration is specific to inter-war cases, 
there is no reason to think that it is specific to causing harm over allowing harm. 
There can also be a problem with successive decisions not to go to war. In such 
cases, the decision not to go to war may result in successive failures to save lives 
where, it turns out, these lives could have been saved at no cost. 
Suppose that X starts five wars, suffers early losses in each, and so kills 50000 
without achieving anything. X then stops fighting as friends of Quota now 
recommend. Y6 then threatens to kill 50000 people. X expects to be able to save the 
50000 at the cost of 10000 lives. X does nothing, the 50000 are killed, and afterwards 
it becomes clear that X could have saved the 50000 without killing anyone – if they 
had crossed the border into Y6, official documents reveal, Y6 would immediately 
have surrendered. Y7 then threatens to kill 50000 people. Again, X expects to be able 
to save the 50000 at the cost of 10000. Again X does nothing, the 50000 are killed, and 
it again becomes clear that the 50000 could have been saved without killing anyone. 
And so on. The intuition that X should, at some point, go to war is just as strong as 
the intuition that X should stop in the intra-war and the inter-war cases.  
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This shows that if there is a problem of iteration, it is a general problem in 
evidence-relative morality. For almost any putative evidence-principle in the ethics 
of harm, complying with the principle can have unexpected very bad consequences, 
or the expected bad consequences can occur without anything good occurring that 
would have justified them. So complying with the principle over and over again can 
have very bad consequences over and over again, with extremely bad consequences 
overall, and without any good occurring that would have justified them.  
Perhaps it might be argued that the problem of iteration should lead us to 
favour a principle that does not permit iteration of the same mistake. That would 
count against Prospect, because Prospect permits X to do the same thing that it has 
already done. But we have no reason to favour a principle that allows many 
different fact-relative mistakes to be made in succession over one that allows the 
same fact-relative mistake to be made in succession! And this is especially so if 
abiding by the principle that recommends altering our conduct increases the 
probability that our successive acts will be gravely wrong in the fact-relative sense. 
It is hard to grasp iteration cases, given that the bad consequences of our 
previous evidence-relative permissible acts often give us new evidence that alters 
what it is evidence-relative permissible to do. This makes our intuitions about such 
cases untrustworthy. Once we see that the possibility of multiple mistakes arises for 
any evidence-relative principle, we should conclude that any inclination that we 
have to revise our evidence-relative principles in the light of the possibility of 
iterated mistakes is fully explained on epistemic grounds. Thus Iteration fails to 
support Quota (or, for that matter, Discount). 
 
II. The Problem of Small Costs 
 
So far we have seen that three arguments that have been offered for Quota fail to 
support it. I now offer this decisive argument against it: Quota implies that it is 
wrong for X to achieve a very great good by causing a very much smaller amount of 
harm at t2 in cases where this is clearly false. For example, Quota sometimes has the 
unpalatable implication that it would be wrong to save the 50000 at the cost of a 
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single extra life, because too much harm has already been caused in the attempt to 
save the 50000.  
 To illustrate the objection, suppose that there is some number between 10000 
and 12000 that is the precise tipping point that makes saving 50000 disproportionate. 
Early deaths caused during the war put X just below the tipping point. X can now 
save the 50000 in a way that will kill one extra person. Quota implausibly implies 
that doing this is wrong. 
 Moellendorf responds that the fact that the whole good can now be achieved 
at such a small cost demonstrates that the proportionality judgement at t1 was 
mistaken. So he rejects a premise of the argument.8 This response cannot be right. If 
there is a precise tipping point, causing n deaths would be proportionate and 
causing n+1 deaths would be disproportionate. For any value of n, it is possible that 
n deaths are caused in early battles achieving nothing, but that the whole good can 
be achieved at t1 at the cost of an extra life. As there must be some value of n that is 
the proportionality threshold, and the problem of small costs can arise whatever that 
value is, the fact that the problem of small costs arises does not show that there is a 
mistake about the initial proportionality judgement.  
Friends of Quota may respond that the problem of small costs does not arise 
because there is indeterminacy at the proportionality threshold.9 About Early Losses, 
they may claim that there are numbers between 10000 and 12000 where it is 
indeterminate whether the war is proportionate. This does not adequately answer 
the objection either. It is hard to believe that the judgement whether Quota, Discount, 
Prospect, or Addition is true depends on the extent of indeterminacy at the 
proportionality threshold. The problem of small future costs brightly illuminates the 
fact that past deaths that one has caused cannot make it wrong to achieve a very 
great good at very little cost. The possibility that the proportionality threshold is 
indeterminate is not responsive to this objection. 
                                                 
8 See Moellendorf ‘Two Doctrines of Jus ex Bello’, 667-8. 
9 Seth Lazar suggests this possibility in ‘Moral Sunk Costs’. He attributes the point to 
discussion with Emily McTernan. 
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Furthermore, this response only makes the implications of Quota more 
plausible where X’s acts at t1 put it near the proportionality threshold. The response 
fails in cases where X’s earlier conduct clearly puts it above that threshold, but the 
objection seems just as forceful in that case. 
Consider: 
 
Early Big Losses: As Early Losses except that 75000 are unexpectedly killed 
before t2. The 50000 can now be saved at an expected cost of one life. 
 
Quota implies that it would be wrong for X to continue to fight. Here is why. It 
would clearly be disproportionate for X to go to war at t1 to save 50000 at the cost of 
75000 lives. It would be even more powerfully disproportionate at t1 to save 50000 at 
the cost of 75001 lives. We are not permitted to kill many more people than we save, 
other things equal, on any sensible view. There is thus no question of revising the 
initial proportionality calculation to explain why saving the 50000 seems 
permissible. And even if there is indeterminacy at the proportionality threshold, this 
war as a whole does not fall in the range where this is true. Therefore, Quota implies 
that it is wrong for X to save 50000 lives at the cost of one life at t2. This implication 
is so implausible that Quota should be rejected simply on this basis.  
 One way to reinforce the conclusion that this is implausible draws on an idea 
explored in the previous section. In determining what X should do, we should 
consider X’s acts together if it either continues or stops. If X continues it will have 
killed 75001 people to save 50000. This is obviously fact-relative wrong, and gravely 
so. And at t2 it has decisive evidence that it will have committed this serious fact-
relative wrong if it continues. But suppose that it stops. It will then have killed 75000 
people to save no one. And killing 75000 people to save no one seems even more 
gravely wrong than killing 75001 people to save 50000.10 
                                                 
10 Fabre acknowledges that reasoning of this kind seems to have force in 
Cosmopolitan Peace, 40. 
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 Note that the following options were available at t1 (though X did not know 
it): 
 
1) Kill no one, resulting in the death of 50000 
2) Kill 75001, but save 50000 
3) Kill 75000, but save no one. 
 
Clearly, X ought to have picked 1) if it were to have known that these were its 
options. At t1, all three options were available to X, and that explains the intuition 
that X acts wrongly, in a sense, by killing 75001 to save 50000. This intuition may 
draw people to Quota – it explains why X’s acts together are fact-relative wrong. But 
X cannot now make it true that its conduct as a whole kills no one, resulting in the 
deaths of 50000. Nothing like 1) is an option for X at t2 in Early Big Losses. It can 
make it true that it has killed 75001, saving 50000 or it can make it true that it has 
killed 75000, saving no one. These are similar to options 2) and 3) that X had at t1. 
Between 2) and 3) at t1, 3) is much worse than 2). Similarly, at t2, X ought to make it 
true that it has killed 75001 saving 50000, rather than making it true that it has killed 
75000 saving no one. By continuing to fight X mitigates the gravity of its overall 
wrongdoing when compared with stopping.11 
 Thinking in this way also helps to support Prospect. Here is a natural way to 
select between 2) and 3). One thing that is equal between 2) and 3) is that 75000 die 
as a result of X’s war. And as these deaths have already occurred at t2, we should 
assume that the very same 75000 people will be killed. It seems natural, then, to treat 
these deaths as providing an equally powerful reason against 2) and 3). If this is 
right, we should chalk these deaths off for the purposes of deciding what to do, and 
consider only the remainder. We should take a similar approach to X’s acts at t2. It 
cannot affect the lives of those it has killed, so we should chalk these deaths off for 
                                                 
11 This is a way of illuminating more brightly a similar idea in D Rodin ‘The War 
Trap: Dilemmas of jus terminatio’ (2015) 125 Ethics 674, 686-92. 
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the purposes of deciding what to do, and consider only the remainder. And that is 
what Prospect recommends. 
  
III. How Do Previous Deaths Count? 
 
We have seen that past deaths cannot have the same weight as future deaths in the 
decision whether to continue a war. Friends of Discount might respond that Prospect 
is implausible, though, because it implies that past deaths do not count at all. For 
example, Fabre, in considering the implications of Prospect for a case that is similar to 
Early Losses writes: 
 
Let us…consider the fate of the ten thousand agents who die between t1 and 
t2. At t1, those deaths are regarded as a bad to be weighed relative to the 
good the war would bring if A initiated it and thus count as a reason against 
going to war – albeit not a sufficiently decisive one. At t2, those deaths simply 
do not count as a bad any more to be weighted relative to the good the war 
would bring if A continued it. The worry is that, on this view, proportionality 
would lose most if its bite as a constraint against killing.12   
 
Fabre goes on to suggest that Prospect implies that proportionality does not 
appropriately constrain war.  
Discount might then seem preferable because it gives some weight to past 
losses, and so does more to constrain war. But there two are decisive objections to 
the idea that past deaths count just like future deaths, though with less weight, in 
determining whether it is proportionate to continue fighting.  
First, the objection concerning small future costs can be extended to show that 
a version of Discount that makes this assumption about relative weighting is false. To 
see this, consider: 
 
                                                 
12 See C Fabre ‘War Exit’ 637. 
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 Early Catastrophic Losses: as Early Big Losses, except that the early battles have 
catastrophic results because nuclear weapons are unexpectedly used, killing 
several million people. X can still save the 50000 at the expected cost of one 
life. 
 
The version of Discount under consideration implies that X ought not to save 50000 
at the cost of one life in Early Catastrophic Losses, because each of the several million 
deaths counts against continuing to fight, and the number of deaths is so large that it 
will outweigh the value of the 50000 lives that will be saved. Versions of Discount 
that have this implication are clearly false.  
Second, past deaths cannot possibly count against continuing to fight in the 
same way as future deaths. Here is why. The deaths that X will cause can, on their 
own, make it wrong for X to save the 50000. If it will kill too many, it ought not to 
save the 50000. The deaths that X has already caused cannot play this role. If it can 
save the lives of 50000 people without harming anyone at all, it is obviously 
permissible to do this, no matter how many deaths it has already caused.  
 This suggests that if past deaths count against continuing to fight, they can 
only do so indirectly. They might do so either by strengthening the reasons against 
killing further people or by weakening the reasons to save the 50000. But they cannot 
provide reasons against continuing to fight on their own. 
 
IV. Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Morality 
 
Here is an argument that past harms strengthen the reasons against killing more 
people to save the 50000. It draws on the relationship between intrapersonal and 
interpersonal cases.13  
                                                 
13 Fabre and I discussed the relationship between intrapersonal and interpersonal 
cases in relation to sunk costs on PEA Soup. Following that discussion, Fabre 
considers the relationship between intrapersonal and interpersonal cases in 
Cosmopolitan Peace 39-40. I am not completely confident of her current view. On the 
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The fact that in the past X has harmed an innocent bystander, A, in the course 
of attempting to save Y plausibly makes a difference to the permissibility of 
inflicting more harm on A in a further attempt to save Y. This may be true because it 
matters that A was harmed by X, or because A has already been harmed whether or 
not that is by X, or even simply because A is badly off. This is an intrapersonal case: 
it concerns the implications of the harm that a person has suffered for the 
permissibility of harming that same person more. Defenders of Discount might argue 
that although there is a difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal harm 
aggregation, this is a difference of degree, not kind. Therefore, the fact that X has 
harmed A in the course of attempting to save Y in the past makes a difference to the 
permissibility of inflicting harm on another innocent bystander, B, in a further 
attempt to save Y.  
Intrapersonal cases may have some implications in war – those who suffer as 
a result of the deaths of some people may suffer more from the deaths of others. In 
this way, past deaths can count against the decision to keep fighting. Furthermore, 
some people who are injured in war may be vulnerable to be harmed further if war 
continues, and again that may make a difference to the permissibility of continuing 
to fight. I set these issues aside. 
 Our intuitions in intrapersonal cases do seem more powerful than our 
intuitions in interpersonal cases. However, there are explanations of our intuitions in 
intrapersonal cases that do not extend to interpersonal cases, and for this reason 
friends of Discount are wrong to rely on them. For example, consider the prioritarian 
view that there is a stronger reason to benefit a person, or not to harm her, if our 
conduct will leave her worse off than if it will leave her better off.14 On this view, it is 
                                                                                                                                                       
one hand she seems to offer the intrapersonal case to defend her rejection of 
something like Prospect. But then she acknowledges that it does not have force in 
pure interpersonal cases, and goes on to suggest that intrapersonal cases are 
common in war. 
14 In Derek Parfit’s classic statement of it, prioritarianism is the view that benefiting 
people matters more the worse off these people are. We are concerned with harming 
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not only the size of the difference that our conduct makes to a person that 
determines what we should do; it is the absolute level of welfare that a person will 
have if we act or refrain from acting. This idea helps to explain our intuitions in 
intrapersonal cases, but has no implications in interpersonal cases. The fact that one 
person has been left very badly off as a result of our actions has no implications for 
what we should do to others as far as prioritarianism is concerned.  
Of course, the prioritarian argument, if it is successful, implies that it is harder 
to justify harming people who are badly off no matter why they are badly off – 
whether that is because of past harms that have bee inflicted on them or not – and no 
matter the identity of the person who will harm them. But then, it is not at all 
obvious that it does make a difference to the permissibility of harming a person that 
they have suffered harms, or suffered harms by the person who might now harm 
them again. 
 A similar thing is true of a further argument that applies in intrapersonal 
cases – one concerning personal prerogatives. A person is entitled to use her 
personal resources to promote her own ends, within certain limits. How the limits of 
personal prerogatives are determined is a difficult question that I cannot address 
here. But it is plausible that the costs that a person is required to bear for the sake of 
some goal depend in part either on whether the person has been harmed for the sake 
of that goal, or harmed independently of that goal, or is badly off. Furthermore, it is 
plausible that the extent to which it is permissible to harm a person for the sake of 
some goal depends in part on whether she would be required to bear costs for the 
sake of that goal. Again, this argument applies in the intrapersonal case, but it has no 
implications in the interpersonal case. 
Of course, some might deny that these ideas fully explain our intuitions in 
intrapersonal cases. But they are sufficient to undermine the argument that Discount 
                                                                                                                                                       
rather than with benefiting. See D Parfit ‘Equality and Priority’ in M Clayton and A 
Williams The Ideal of Equality (London: MacMillan, 2000). Prioritarians, though, will 
surely also believe that our reasons against harming people are stronger the worse 
off these people will be. 
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gains support from intrapersonal cases. The more powerful intuitions that we have 
in intrapersonal cases can provide no support for a view like Discount if there are 
plausible explanations of those intuitions that do not apply in interpersonal cases. 
And there are. Thus we do better to consider interpersonal cases directly. 
 
V. Do Past Harms have Indirect Significance? 
 
We have seen that if past deaths are morally significant for future conduct in Early 
Losses, they are only indirectly significant. The two most natural indirect ideas are 
that past deaths weaken the rights of the 50000 to be saved, or that they strengthen 
X’s duty not to kill more people.  
 
i) Are the Rights of the 50000 weakened? 
 
One idea is that the right of the 50000 to be saved is weakened by the fact that harm 
has been caused in the course of an attempt to save them. Some might draw on the 
idea that after a certain number of deaths are caused in the course of attempts to 
rescue them, enough has been done for them. 
 A radical, and implausible, version of this idea is that the rights of the 50000 
can be exhausted by deaths caused in the course of attempts to save them. This view 
implies that if enough people are killed in the attempt to save the 50000, they have 
no right to be saved even if they can be saved at no cost to anyone. 
To reinforce the conclusion that this view is implausible, notice that it implies 
that the 50000 have lost their right to be saved from being wrongfully killed by Y’s 
officials because of a terrible accident that occurred in the course of an attempt to 
save them. They have done nothing to lose their rights. The idea that their rights to 
be saved from the lethal threat they face is completely vitiated simply by their bad 
luck at others trying and failing to save them in a way that causes harm to others is 
hard to accept. 
 This leaves open the possibility that their rights to be saved are weakened but 
can never be negated by the harm that has been caused for their sake. And if that is 
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true, it might be argued that they can no longer demand that attempts are made to 
save them where these attempts would risk the lives of many innocent people, even 
if they would have had such a demand were past harms not to have been caused for 
their sake. 
 Even this weaker idea seems false. I suspect that any intuitive force in the idea 
that enough has been done for the 50000 draws on the attractive and more general 
idea that there are limits to what we have to do for others. But I think that a proper 
understanding of the latter idea does not imply that the rights of the 50000 are 
weakened. 
Earlier, I offered two explanations of the wrongness of harming a person who 
has already been harmed: prioritarianism and agent-relative prerogatives. These 
ideas also help to explain the general idea that there are limits to the burdens we 
need to bear for the sake of others. But we have already seen that neither of these 
ideas support Discount.  
Discount relies on some further version of the idea that there are limits to how 
much we must do for others. But it is not clear what this idea is. Suppose that one 
person tries to rescue me and fails. That person might plausibly claim that she has 
done enough for me if the cost is large enough. Those who are harmed as a side-
effect of the failed attempt might also plausibly claim that they cannot be expected to 
bear any further cost for my sake.  
But why should this have any bearing on what I am owed by those who have 
not yet tried to help me, or those who have not yet been harmed in any attempt to 
save me? My circumstances have not changed as a result of the attempt: I am in just 
as much peril as I was before. These other people have not been affected either. So it 
is hard to see how the failed attempt to rescue me has any bearing on the strength of 
my right to be saved. 
 
ii) Are X’s Duties not to Harm Others Strengthened? 
 
Another possibility is that X’s duty not to harm others is strengthened by the deaths 
that it causes. A broad version of this idea is that X’s general duty not to harm others 
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is strengthened, whether or not harm is inflicted for Y’s sake. The more deaths there 
are on X’s ledger, it might be argued, the more stringent is its duty not to kill in the 
future.  
This general view comes in several flavours. The broadest view counts all 
deaths on X’s ledger, whether or not inflicting those deaths was fact-relative wrong. 
This view is especially implausible. Consider a country that engages in very many 
just wars, achieving a great deal of good. The harm inflicted in each war, considered 
on its own, would have been proportionate. The broad view implies that each 
successive war becomes harder to justify, making some of the later wars 
disproportionate. There is little appeal in the idea that a country that is especially 
good at fighting proportionate wars faces increasingly high proportionality hurdles. 
A slightly narrower view counts only those deaths that it was fact-relative 
wrong for X to cause. The more such deaths that X causes, the more stringent X’s 
duty is not to cause further deaths. But it is also hard to support this view. It is only 
permissible to cause a death if in doing so one will achieve some good aim (or has 
good prospects of doing so). The aim under consideration in cases such as Early 
Losses is the prevention of wrongful death by others. The view under consideration 
implies that those who wrongly cause deaths (in the fact-relative sense) should be 
more inclined to allow such future deaths to occur than to cause such future deaths. 
It is hard to see why this should be so: why should past fact-relative wrongdoing 
make a difference to the stringency of the obligation not to cause more deaths, but 
not to the stringency of the obligation not to allow more deaths? 
A still narrower view counts only those deaths that it is fact-relative wrongful 
to cause in this particular war. This view is also problematic. There is a difficult 
metaphysical question how to individuate wars. It is often hard to know whether 
some fighting counts as the continuation of one war, or as the beginning of a new 
war. Fortunately, those working on the morality of war don’t seem to need to 
answer that question, as it seems that there is nothing morally significant about how 
it is answered. The view under consideration, though, would make this seemingly 
irrelevant question morally significant. 
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Finally, we might consider the view that the deaths that matter are those that 
are caused in the service of the end of saving the 50000. But this view is very close to 
Weakened Rights that we considered in the previous subsection, and in the light of the 
arguments offered there it is hard to see how to support it. 
 Overall, it proves very difficult even to state a version of Discount that has 
plausible implications. I have explored several arguments to support it, but none of 
them seem convincing. And we can show why its apparent appeal is illusory. 
Overall, I think we should reject it. 
 
VI. Doubts about Addition 
 
This leaves us with Prospect and Addition. Recall that Addition is the view that deaths 
to innocent people caused in the past make it easier to justify harming others, so that 
killing more innocent people in the future is permitted to achieve the same goal than 
would have been the case had these past deaths not occurred.  
Arguments for Addition are even harder to find than arguments for Discount. 
Like Discount in order to be at all plausible Addition needs to be carefully interpreted. 
If it is not, it will suffer from the opposite problem to Discount that we considered in 
Section III: if the death toll is high enough, the reasons against killing more people 
for the sake of a goal will become weaker and weaker, so that it will become 
permissible to kill very many people in order to save far fewer people. This suggests 
that if lives lost make it easier to justify killing, they only do so somewhere near the 
proportionality threshold. Let us consider a version of Addition of that kind. 
 
i) Disincentives 
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One argument that might be offered in favour of Addition is that those with the 
attitudes that Addition recommends them to have incentivise their opponents to 
minimize casualties in war.15 
 To see why, recall Early Losses. Whether X’s war is, as a whole, proportionate, 
depends on whether more than 10000 are killed to save the 50000. Some of the 
deaths that result from X going to war are caused directly by X, some directly by Y, 
and some directly by third parties. X causes the deaths of the latter two groups 
indirectly – X’s decision to go to war affects the acts of Y and others, resulting in 
some deaths. There is a difficult question about whether all of these deaths count 
equally in the proportionality calculation, given the role of intervening agents. For 
the sake of simplicity, let us assume that they do.16 
 At t1, the deaths that Y will cause if X continues to fight help to make 
continuing to fight disproportionate. Now suppose that X has the attitude that it will 
treat deaths caused as reasons against continuing to fight, as Quota recommends. Y 
then has an incentive to kill, for the more people it kills in response to X’s decision to 
go to war, the more likely it is that X’s war will be disproportionate. If X respects 
Quota, the sooner Y makes it true that X has reached its quota, the sooner X will stop 
fighting. This may seem a good reason to reject Quota. 
 If it is, it is also favours accepting Addition. If X has the attitude that it will 
treat deaths caused as reasons to continue fighting, as Addition recommends, Y has 
an even stronger disincentive to kill. For the more innocent people that Y kills in the 
course of the war, the more X will be inclined to keep fighting.  
I suspect, though, that this argument does not support Addition. It is an 
argument that X should have the attitude of treating Addition as true rather than an 
argument that Addition is true. The reason X should have the attitude of treating 
Addition as true is that its having this attitude maximises its chances of saving the 
                                                 
15 Here I draw on T Kelly ‘Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting for the Sake of the 
Past’ (2004) 38 Noûs 60, 65-70. 
16 For arguments that what is assumed is true, see V Tadros ‘Permissibility in a 
World of Wrongdoing’ (2016) 44 Philosophy and Public Affairs 101. 
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50000 at as little cost as possible. But the fact that its having this attitude would have 
this effect cannot alter the proportionality calculation as such. Rather, X has a reason 
to have an attitude of treating past deaths as reason-conferring even though they are 
not, because doing so minimizes losses, and thus makes X more likely to comply 
with its actual moral obligations.17   
 
ii) Redemption 
 
Earlier, I explored a way of supporting Discount by drawing on intrapersonal cases. 
Some may be tempted to do the same in defending Addition. In intrapersonal cases, 
many people are inclined to honour sunk costs. If we incur some cost in pursuit of a 
plan and then abandon the plan, the cost will have gone to waste. Whilst many 
people think that the fact that many people do this is a sign of our irrationality, 
others disagree. They think that there is value in redeeming the costs that we have 
borne for the sake of a certain goal; something that we do by achieving the goal.18 
Again, if the difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal cases is only one of 
degree some support might be found for Addition. 
Furthermore, the intrapersonal argument in favour of Addition might seem 
better than the intrapersonal argument in favour of Discount, at least in one way, 
because those who think that we have reasons to honour sunk costs explain why 
bearing a cost for the sake of some end matters as such, rather than instrumentally. 
Some think that the fact that a person has sacrificed something for the sake of 
some end is a reason for that person or others to pursue that end. The reason is that 
                                                 
17 For a similar way of understanding the relationship between our reasons to act 
and our reasons to have certain attitudes that determine how we will act, compare D 
Parfit Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP, 1984) s.5. 
18 For subtly different views, see S Keller ‘Welfare and the Achievement of Goals’ 
(2004) 121 Philosophical Studies 27; T Kelly ‘Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting for 
the Sake of the Past’; D Portmore ‘Welfare, Achievement, and Self-Sacrifice’ (2006-8) 
2 Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1. 
 27 
their sacrifices will then not have been in vain.19 In the central cases, one person, A, 
makes a sacrifice for the sake of some goal, g, but fails to achieve g. Either A, or a 
second person, B, can add to A’s contribution, and g will be achieved. If g is 
achieved, A’s earlier sacrifices will not have been in vain, and this gives A a reason 
to achieve g, and it gives B such a reason too, especially if A cannot achieve g. This is 
part of a wider set of cases where one has reason to act in a certain way because that 
will bestow meaning or value on one’s previous actions or efforts.20 
Jeff McMahan plausibly argues that deaths to combatants on the just side of a 
war can make achieving a just cause more valuable because achieving it would 
redeem the sacrifices of those who have died in the course of attempting to secure 
that cause. 21 Some might then argue that because achieving the just cause would 
have greater value, greater costs can be inflicted on innocent people as a side-effect 
of its pursuit. Although McMahan does not think that wide-proportionality is 
affected by redemption, he admits that he lacks a fully satisfactory explanation why; 
he describes his view – that redemption can make a difference to narrow 
proportionality, but not to wide proportionality – as paradoxical.22 
Even if there are reasons of redemption, they cannot contribute to a defence of 
Addition, for Addition is not concerned with the deaths of those who are pursuing just 
aims, but only the deaths of those killed as a side-effect of the pursuit of those aims. 
                                                 
19 Abraham Lincoln relied on this idea in the Gettysburg Address when he said: ‘It is 
for us the living, rather, to be dedicated to the great task remaining before us – that 
from these honoured dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they 
gave the last full measure of devotion – that we here highly resolve that these dead 
shall not have died in vain.’ I am grateful to an associate editor of Philosophy and 
Public Affairs for the quote. 
20 For good discussion, see J McMahan The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of 
Life (Oxford: OUP, 2002) 174-85; Kelly ‘Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting for the 
Sake of the Past’. 
21 ‘Proportionality and Time’ 710-17. 
22 ‘Proportionality and Time’ 718. 
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As we will see in a moment, it is hard to extend the idea to support Addition. But I 
also think that McMahan’s view that wide-proportionality is more generally 
unaffected by reasons of redemption can be defended. Here is how. Fully just 
combatants intend both to secure the just cause, but also to respect the value of the 
lives of those they will harm as a side-effect of pursuing that cause. Those aiming to 
redeem their losses must respond appropriately to both of these attitudes when 
deciding how to redeem their sacrifices. But if they kill more people than would 
otherwise have been permissible to secure the ends of those who have been killed 
they will fail to do so. 
To illustrate, suppose that Phase 1, a group of X’s well-motivated combatants, 
aims to contribute to the saving of the 50000 and they are killed in the process. Phase 
2 can then save the 50000, but they will kill 12000. I have stipulated that it would 
have been disproportionate for Phase 1 to save 50000 at the cost of 12000. This is 
because of the value of the lives of the 12000. As Phase 1 would not have saved the 
50000 at this cost, it is hard to see how saving the 50000 at that cost redeems the 
sacrifices of members of Phase 1. True, they were pursuing the aim of saving the 
50000. But they aimed to do so only in a way that would show proper respect for the 
lives of those that they might otherwise kill in the process.  
Given that the 12000 have done nothing to alter their moral status, it is hard to 
see how members of Phase 2 would respect the ambitions of members of Phase 1 by 
saving the 50000 at the cost of 12000 lives. They would disrespect those who have 
died by treating the lives of the 12000 as less significant than the 50000 in a way that 
those in Phase 1 would have rejected in their own plans to save the 50000. 
Obviously, the redemption argument cannot be rescued by pointing to the fact that 
Phase 1 would have killed disproportionately to save the 50000 – we don’t have 
reasons to redeem wrongful plans. So it seems that the redemption argument fails, 
even when we focus on combatants who die in pursuit of the just cause. 
How, then, can redemption make a difference to narrow proportionality? It 
might seem that it cannot, for just combatants also have the ambition of abiding by 
narrow proportionality considerations. One answer is that deaths earlier in the war 
can alter the grounds of liability of those fighting unjustly at a later time. The 
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achievement of the just cause would help to redeem the losses suffered by 
combatants who died earlier in the war. This gives combatants fighting on the unjust 
side an extra reason to desist – not only does their fighting threaten to prevent the 
initial just cause from being realized; it threatens to prevent the losses suffered by 
those who have died on the just side from being redeemed. Their liability to be 
harmed, then, may be grounded not only in their responsibility for a threat to the 
achievement of the initial just cause but also in their responsibility for a threat to the 
achievement of redemption. I am not sure even whether this view is true, but it is 
plausible. 
As McMahan notes, though, even if this argument is wrong, and redemption 
makes a difference to wide as well as narrow proportionality, it is difficult to see 
how it can be extended to cases like Early Losses. The value of redemption seems 
most plausibly explained by the respect that we have for the decisions that rational 
agents make to pursue certain ends and for the sacrifices they make in pursuit of 
those ends.23 We can make the projects that they have sacrificed a great deal for 
successful by completing those projects ourselves. Some also argue that this idea can 
improve the welfare of those who have made sacrifices in pursuit of the relevant 
goals. This is plausible because it is plausible that our welfare depends in part on our 
achievements.24 
This idea applies more naturally to combatants than to innocent people killed 
as a side-effect in war. Although their lives have been lost in the course of an attempt 
to save the 50000, they were not pursuing the goal of saving the 50000. So the idea 
that their deaths will have been sacrificed in vain if X does not continue to fight has 
                                                 
23 See, also, Kelly ‘Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting for the Sake of the Past’, 78. 
For the view that it is sacrifices made, rather than effort expended, that ought to be 
redeemed see Portmore ‘Welfare, Achievement, and Self-Sacrifice’. 
24 See Portmore ‘Welfare, Achievement, and Self-Sacrifice’; Keller ‘Welfare and the 
Achievement of Goals’. For the view that achievements contribute to welfare more 
generally, see T M Scanlon What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
UP, 1998) ch.3. 
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much less force in their case; even if it has some force, I doubt that it has enough to 
make a difference in matters of life and death.25 
 
Conclusion 
 
Quota and Discount have a certain initial appeal, but that appeal is largely illusory. 
That does not show that these views are wrong. Quota is clearly wrong, though. It is 
more difficult to decide whether Discount is wrong. A defence relies on some version 
of Weakened Rights or Strengthened Duties. But it is difficult to see how to defend these 
views. The best arguments for Addition also seem to fail. Overall, I conclude that we 
have most reason to accept Prospect. 
 
                                                 
25 See, also, McMahan ‘Proportionality and Time’ 713. 
